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Abstract:  A key selling point for the restructuring of electricity markets was the promise of 
lower prices, that competition among independent power suppliers would lower electricity prices 
to retail customers. There is not much consensus in earlier studies on the effects of electricity 
deregulation, particularly for residential customers. Part of the reason for not finding a consistent 
link with deregulation and lower prices was that the removal of the transitional price caps led to 
higher prices. In addition, the timing of the removal of price caps coincided with rising fuel 
prices, which were passed on to consumers in a competitive market. Using a dynamic panel 
model, we analyze the effect of participation rates, fuel costs, market size, a rate cap and a switch 
to competition for 16 states and the District of Columbia. We find that an increase in 
participation rates, price controls, a larger market, and high shares of hydro in electricity 
generation lower retail prices, while increases in natural gas and coal prices increase rates. The 
effects of a competitive retail electricity market are mixed across states, but generally appear to 
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Did Residential Rates Fall After Retail Competition? A Dynamic Panel Analysis 
 
I. Introduction 
 Electricity  market  restructuring has received significant attention in the energy economics 
literature, particularly in the mid-2000s after many states restructured their electricity markets 
and offered retail choice.  A key selling point for the restructuring of electricity markets was the 
promise of lower retail electric prices, that competition among independent power suppliers to 
lure customers from the incumbent utility company’s default or “standard offer” service would 
lower prices to retail customers.    
  There is no consensus among earlier studies on how restructuring affected retail prices.  
Zarnikau and Whitworth (2006), Rose (2004) and  Joskow (2006) note that large commercial and 
industrial customers have realized some cost-saving benefits from competition, while Apt (2005) 
concludes that competition has not lowered electricity rates for industrial users. Joskow (2006) 
finds retail competition lowers both residential and industrial electricity prices, but attributes the 
price decline to non-market artifacts of restructuring legislation and regulated default service 
rather than competitive forces.   In a study focusing on the residential market in Texas, Zarnikau 
and Whitworth (2006) show that electricity rates rose faster in areas of the state that were open to 
retail competition than in areas that were not.  
  It is important to note that the timing of many of these earlier studies of electricity 
restructuring was such that many of the states offering retail choice to residential customers had 
regulated default service, transitional pricing mechanisms, or other price controls in place. These 
temporary price controls varied across states, but their common purpose was to protect 
consumers and power generators from price volatility in the transition to a competitive market.  
As Joskow (2006) notes, there is an inseparability of the effects of these price controls from 3 
 
those of increased competition, resulting in overstated benefits of retail competition. Further, as 
Axelrod, et.al. (2006) point out, the expiration of these price controls led to sharp rate increases 
as price controls were removed and market forces took over. Another factor in the rise of retail 
price was that the expiration of many of these price controls was followed by periods of fuel cost 
increases. Together, these factors contributed significantly to higher electric rates and led many 
to conclude that competition at the wholesale and retail levels had resulted in higher electric rates 
(Axelrod, DeRamus, and Cain, 2006).  In a more recent paper, Kang and Zarnikau (2009) show 
that retail prices declined in Texas after the removal of price caps.   
  The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) market presents an especially 
interesting case for study and a baseline for comparison given its wide regard as the most 
successful retail market in North America (Adib and Zarnikau, 2006). The ERCOT market has 
been successful in attracting a large number of providers offering choice to customers of all 
sizes.  The ERCOT market also leads all other states with 50.6% of residential customers 
choosing a competitive retail electric provider (CREP)
1.  In this paper, we use panel data to study 
16 states and the District of Columbia that started retail competition in the late 90s and early 
2000s, and have mainly completed their restructuring and ended their transitional prices.  Among 
these states, only California and Virginia have suspended retail competition for residential 
customers.  Given that transitional pricing ended several years ago in most of these states, we 
have several years of data to study the effects of retail competition.   We contribute to the 
literature in a couple of ways.  We estimate the effects of retail competition and transitional 
pricing on residential electric rates, using Texas as a baseline and estimating separate effects of 
these policies for individual states in our panel where possible. The second major contribution of 
                                                            




this paper is to estimate the effect of increased residential customer participation in a competitive 
markets on residential electric rates. The analysis is conducted using a dynamic panel model, 
where cost drivers and participation are allowed to affect residential electric rates with a lag. We 
find that an increase in participation rates, price controls, a larger market, and high shares of 
hydro in electricity generation lower retail prices, while increases in natural gas and coal prices 
increase rates. The effect of moving to a competitive retail electricity market is mixed across 
states, but generally appears to lower prices in states with high participation and raise prices in 
states that have little customer participation. 
II. Data and Model   
  Our goal is to develop a model of electricity prices  for residential customers that takes 
advantage of differences both within and across states that have or have had retail competition in 
their electricity markets. We are interested in examining differences in the effects of retail 
competition programs and transitional pricing schemes across states. Earlier studies (eg, Joskow 
2006) do a panel data analysis of a similar flavor but do not attempt to single out differences 
across states. Further, earlier studies fail to separate the effects of retail competition from 
temporary effects of transitional price controls and level of participation by residential 
customers. We develop a dynamic panel model that accounts for the aforementioned issues. 
  The data employed in our analysis is a monthly panel of 16 states and the District of 
Columbia. The states analyzed are CA, CT, DC, DE ,IL, MA, MD, ME, MI, NH, NJ, NY, OH, 
PA, RI,TX and VA. Table 1 shows these states and the start and completion of their 
restructuring.   The panel contains 3,247 observations and covers a period from January 1990 to 
May 2010. The data are primarily from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and 
state Public Utility Commissions. The dependent variable is seasonally adjusted average real 
price per kilowatt-hour (kWh) for residential customers. As a key independent variable, we 5 
 
include the percent of eligible residential customers who have chosen a competitive provider in 
each state to capture the level of market participation by residential customers. The model allows 
participation by residential customers and various control variables to affect residential electric 
rates at a lag of up to six months. We choose the six month lag length as suggested by the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA, 2007), because fuel costs would take around six months to be 
reflected in customer rates. We use this lag length as a base for our model and assume that other 
cost drivers would take an equal or lesser amount of time to be reflected in customer rates.  
   To control for input costs of electric generating facilities that might be passed on to 
customers, we include the real average cost of coal for electricity generation and the real average 
cost of natural gas for electricity generation. We also include controls for each state’s percentage 
of generation from nuclear and hydro sources. The total number of megawatt hours sold in each 
state is included to control for market size, and the deviation from normal heating and cooling 
degree days is included to capture weather-related demand spikes. We include dummy variables 
to capture months when each state is open to electric competition for residential customers
2, and 
months when each state had some sort of price control or transitional pricing (rate cap, rate 
freeze, etc.) in addition to retail competition. Finally, we include a lag of seasonally adjusted 
average real price per kilowatt-hour (kWh) for residential customers in an effort to proxy for 
unknown omitted variables that affect prices historically. This lagged dependent variable may 





2 While many states had “pilot” periods where some portion of residential customers were able to choose their 
electric provider, the retail competition dummy variable is set =1 only when retail competition is open to ALL 
residential customers. The exception here is Texas, where we make the simplifying assumption that all residential 




The baseline model to be estimated is of the form: 
                                  Δyit=(Δxi,t-k)’β+δ(Δyi,t-1)+ fit’γ+Δεit                              (1) 
where x  is a vector of control variables at lags kאK={0,1,2,3,4,5,6} believed to influence 
residential electric rates:  
PARTICIPATIONi,t-k   Percent of residential electric customers in state 
i choosing a competitive retail electric provider 
at time t-k  
LNTOTALSALESMWHi,t-k  Log of total megawatt hours sold in state i at 
time t-k   
LNCOALPRICEELECGENi,t-k  Log of real national average cost of coal for 
electricity generation at time t-k   
LNGASPRICELECGENi,t-k  Log of real national average cost of natural gas 
for electricity generation at time t-k   
PCNTHYDROi,t-k  Percent of electric generation from hydro in 
state i at time t-k   
PCNTNUCLEARi,t-k  Percent of electric generation from nuclear in 
state i at time t-k   
CDDEVi,t-k  
 
Deviation from normal number of cooling 
degree days in state i at time t-k   
HDDEVi,t-k  
 
Deviation from normal number of heating 
degree days in state i at time t-k   
and f is a vector of dummy variables:  
RETAILCOMPit  =1 if state i was open to residential retail electric 
competition at time t; =0 otherwise
  
RATECAPit  =1 if state i had a transitional price control or rate cap in 
place at time t; =0 otherwise 
RETAILCOMPit*STATEi  Interaction of STATEi with RETAILCOMPit, defined above
  3 
 
RATECAPit*STATEi  Interaction of STATEi with RATECAPit, defined above
   
εit is a state specific heteroskedastic error term, and β ,δ, and γ are parameters to be estimated.  
                                                            
3 This allows for estimation of a state-specific coefficient for RETAILCOMP that is used to determine the effects of 
retail competition in that state particular state. The RATECAP and the state dummy variable interaction serves an 
analogous purpose. Texas is the omitted state dummy and serves as the baseline for comparison. 7 
 
We first-difference all continuous variables to remove fixed effects that maybe present while 
also addressing nonstationarity of the individual time series. Dummy variables controlling for 
retail competition and transitional pricing schemes enter the model in levels. We adopt the level 
form of the dummy variables to capture effects on residential electricity rates over the time they 
are in place rather through a one-time impact
4.   
  The introduction of a lagged dependent variable as a regressor in the framework of a 
usual first-differences model results in inconsistent estimates because of correlation between 
Δyi,t-1 and Δεit , through the shared term εit-1. Several techniques have been suggested to handle 
such situations. Anderson and Hsiao (1982) suggest using an instrumental variables approach to 
estimate a first-differenced equation, where the lagged dependent variable regressor (Δyi,t-1) is 
instrumented using either Δyi,t-2  or  yi,t-2. Arellano (1989) finds efficiency in the approach of 
using the level variable as an instrument in lieu of lagged differences, and Arellano and Bond 
(1991) examine one-step and two-step GMM estimators that essentially expand on the work of 
Anderson-Hsiao (1982) and Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988). The Arellano-Bond (1991) 
approach considers additional lags of the dependent variable as instruments, thus improving 
efficiency by taking advantage of the additional moment conditions. Kiviet (1995) proposes the 
usual least squares dummy variable approach and develops a bias correction that he finds to be 
more efficient than GMM estimates.  
  We face an additional complication in choosing an appropriate estimation technique 
because we have a long panel, i.e., a long time dimension (large T) and few cross sections (small 
N) while all of the aforementioned solutions assume large N and small T. Judson and Owen 
(1999) address this very topic, conducting a Monte Carlo study to examine the properties of 
                                                            
4 This is a simplifying assumption. Idiosyncrasies across states will result in price controls and retail competition 
affecting prices over varied time periods.   8 
 
these estimators in our situation and that usually faced by macroeconomists. Judson and Owen 
(1999) conclude that even with a fairly long time series, the asymptotic bias should not be 
ignored, although they do find improvement in all estimators as the time dimension of the panel 
increases. The suggested method for the longest timeframe considered with an unbalanced panel 
is the usual least squares dummy variable fixed effects estimator (Judson and Owen, 1999). This 
is consistent with the findings of Nickell (1981) and the suggestion of  Roodman (2006). We also 
consider Judson and Owen’s (1999) suggestion of Arellano-Bond one-step GMM estimation as a 
second best choice. Because Arellano-Bond estimation is an instrumental variables approach, it 
has the added advantage of allowing us to test for and address, if necessary, potentially 
endogenous variables in the model such as PARTICIPATION. 
  Due to the possibility of endogeneity of the PARTICIPATION variable, as well as to 
mitigate any concerns of inconsistency or concerns of spurious correlation resulting from 
nonstationarity of individual time series, we settle on Arellano-Bond one-step difference GMM 
estimation.  A difference-in-Sargan test suggests that in fact, the PARTICIPATION variable is 
not endogenous in this data and therefore does not need to be instrumented. We believe this 
finding is plausible given the length of the time series employed and that in this particular data 
set, well over half of the years in the set contain PARTICIPATION values of zero yet some price 
fluctuation still occurred. We proceed in our analysis operating under this assumption. 
  Because the time dimension of our panel is large, we must be aware of the issue of 
instrument proliferation resulting from Arellano-Bond estimation on data with a large time 
dimension. Using the default Arellano-Bond approach in panels with long time dimensions, the 
number of instruments grows rapidly and causes overfitting of the endogenous variables 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2010; Roodman, 2006). Roodman (2009) suggests two solutions to this 
problem. The first is limiting the number of lags to be used as instruments to fewer than all 9 
 
available lags as is the default of Arellano-Bond. This results in what Judson and Owen (1999) 
call a “restricted GMM” estimator, which they find to be computationally less-taxing but without 
significant loss of effectiveness. Additionally, Roodman (2009) suggests “collapsing” the 
instrument matrix. This involves horizontally collapsing the usual instrument matrix containing 
an instrument for every lag available at each time period (a matrix that is quadratic in T) to a 
simplified instrument matrix that only adds columns or instruments when additional lags are 
used as instruments. The moment conditions associated with the usual instrument matrix imply 
the moment conditions associated with the collapsed instrument matrix, however, some 
efficiency is lost simply because there are fewer moment conditions to satisfy.   
  We employ both of Roodman’s (2009) suggestions for reducing the instrument count. 
Keeping with a goal of a few, strong instruments we choose to limit our set of instruments to two 
lags of the dependent variable; specifically, instruments for Δyi,t-1 are yi,t-2, yi,t-3. This allows 
efficiency gains over the just-identified case while still keeping the size of the instrument matrix 
under control. Estimation with three lags as instruments results in no observable efficiency gains, 
and more than three lags cannot be confirmed as valid instruments
5.  As a check of robustness 
and to increase the model’s flexibility, we also consider an analogous model with the addition of 
year time dummies.  
  We estimate both models with the intention of examining contemporaneous and lagged 
effects. The contemporaneous effect is determined from the coefficient at lag 0. To determine 
lagged effects of our control variables, we perform hypothesis testing on sums of lagged 
coefficients. This allows us to determine the number of months over which the variable has a 
lagged impact on residential electricity rates. 
                                                            
5 As suggested by the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences when more than three lags are used as 
instruments. 10 
 
III. Results  
    
  The results from the estimation are generally consistent with our expectations.  Tables 3a 
and 3b show results from the baseline model.  An increase in participation rates takes some time 
to be reflected in lower electricity prices.  Although the contemporaneous effect of the 
participation rate on retail prices is positive and significant, the lagged effects of increased 
participation are negative, significant, and larger in magnitude than the contemporaneous effect. 
A 10 percentage point increase in participation initially raises the price by 2.9 percent but then 
lowers the price by 4.3 percent, with the full effect taking around 6 months to be reflected in 
prices. The positive coefficient estimate on the contemporaneous effect of increased participation 
matches Kang and Zarnikau’s (2009) results.  A higher participation rate implies that a larger 
group of residential customers are switching to competitive retail electricity providers (CREPs), 
increasing the share supplied by competitive retailers, and eventually lowering the overall 
residential price of electricity. The magnitude of the coefficient may seem small, but it is similar 
to estimates by Kang and Zarnikau (2009) for Texas. As Chart 1 shows, the participation rate 
does not start rising for some states until the states are well into restructuring, and really takes off 
after price controls are removed. In the case of Texas, participation rises nearly linearly from the 
start of retail competition, suggesting a transitional pricing scheme that encouraged competition 
early on. These differences illustrate the idiosyncrasies of state transitional pricing schemes that 
provide different incentives for customers to switch providers, and for competitive providers to 
serve residential customers in a given market. These differences and findings are further 
discussed below.  For many states, participation rates are still quite low, but our findings suggest 
that higher participation rates lead to lower retail prices.  11 
 
  The contemporaneous effect of a change in total megawatt hours sold in a state is a 
statistically significant decline in retail prices.  Lagged effects are positive but statistically 
insignificant. If we think of the MWh variable as a measure of the size of the total electricity 
market, then the larger the market, the more suppliers it can support, leading to more competition 
and lower prices. A larger market may also result in lower prices because of economies of scale 
in electricity generation.   
  As would be expected, increases in the prices of fuels used to generate electricity have an 
overall positive effect on retail prices. The effects of the rise in fuel prices come in with a lag, as  
neither coal nor natural gas prices used in electricity generation have a significant 
contemporaneous effect on retail electricity prices. A rise in natural gas prices has a significant 
effect on electricity prices with a lag of two months, reflecting the time required for increased 
fuel costs to be passed to consumers.  As seen in Table 3a, a 10 percent increase in the price of 
natural gas leads to a statistically significant 0.2 percent increase in the price of electricity at the 
end of two months.  To put this in perspective, if an average customer used 1000 KWh per 
month, a 10 percent increase in natural gas prices would imply a small $3.29 increase in the 
customer’s annual electricity bill, assuming the panel mean rate of 13.7 cents/KWh. In the first 
half of our sample, natural gas prices to electricity generators were relatively stable, averaging 
around $2.50 per year. Furthermore, electricity rates in the vast majority of states were still under 
regulation and less sensitive to short run volatility in fuel prices. However, in the second half, as 
restructuring got under way in the 2000s, natural gas prices were very volatile (Chart 2), with 
prices ranging from $4 to $12.  As rate caps ended, consumers who had switched to competitive 
providers and who were in states which depended on natural gas for a majority of their 
generation, such as Massachusetts, Maine, New York, and Texas probably saw their retail prices 
go up substantially as natural gas prices remained high. However, our finding of a relatively 12 
 
small effect of natural gas prices on monthly retail rates is consistent with Bushnell and 
Mansur’s (2005) finding that monthly retail rates do not capture much of the volatility of natural 
gas prices.  Moreover, most generators buy their natural gas with longer contracts, rather than on 
the spot market, dampening the pass-through of short-term gas price volatility.   
  Similarly, an increase in the price of coal has a positive and significant effect for all lags. 
A10 percent increase in the price of coal results in increases in retail electricity prices ranging 
from 2.1 percent in the first month to 2.9 percent through the sixth month.  This effect is much 
larger than the effect of gas prices; however, coal prices have been much less volatile over the 
sample period.   
For states that used either hydro or nuclear as the energy source for electricity generation, 
an increased share of hydro generation lowers retail prices while an increased share of nuclear 
generation has no significant effect on retail prices because all nuclear coefficients are all 
insignificant.   No state in our panel has hydro as their main source of generation, but California, 
New York, and Maine all have a sizable hydro share.  Nuclear is the main source of energy for 
Connecticut’s electricity generation, while Illinois has 48 percent, New York has 31 percent and 
Pennsylvania has a 35 percent share of nuclear in their power generation.  Comparing our results 
to Joskow (2006), we find that signs on our contemporaneous coefficients (which are 
insignificant) are opposite of Joskow’s but that our lagged effects match the sign of Joskow’s 
results. Two points are worth noting here. First, Joskow (2006) uses annual rather than monthly 
data. Second, because we are dealing with monthly data we are primarily interested in the lagged 
effects of these variables since changes in generation costs take some number of months to be 
reflected in customer rates. Thus, it seems plausible that signs on our lagged values using 
monthly data would more closely match Joskow’s (2006) contemporaneous values using annual 
data.  13 
 
  We would expect deviations from normal heating and cooling degree days to have a 
positive effect on retail prices.  The signs of the coefficients of these variables are mixed, but all 
were insignificant, adding no explanatory power to the estimation. One possible explanation for 
these results could be that the effect of these variables is being picked up by the electricity usage 
variable.   
  Table 3a also shows the state effects of retail competition and transitional pricing (the 
RETAILCOMP and RATECAP variables) on retail prices. The separate state dummy variables for 
RETAILCOMP and RATECAP are useful for two reasons. First, states have had varied levels of 
success in their restructuring efforts. Second, it is likely that the timing of effects from different 
retail competition setups and price controls was quite different. For instance, one state may have 
seen the full effect as soon as a price control was put in place while a different state may have 
seen more gradual price effects. The coefficients on the RETAILCOMP and RATECAP dummies 
are interpreted as the monthly growth of residential electricity rates when retail competition 
and/or a price control is in place. These coefficients are best interpreted if annualized.  
Annualizing the coefficient -.0034 for RETAILCOMP suggests that, holding all else equal, 
having a competitive retail market in Texas caused the average residential electric bill to decline 
at approximately a 4.0 percent annual rate over the sample period. 
   Our results suggest that state effects of competitive markets and transitional pricing are 
somewhat mixed.  For Texas, Connecticut, Maine, and Pennsylvania, moving to a competitive 
retail market lowers retail prices. Texas, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania have relatively high 
participation rates, and Pennsylvania still had some price controls in place over our sample 
period. Although the participation rate for Maine is low in Table 1, Maine’s restructuring 
initiatives differ from many other states and a very high percentage of Maine customers 
essentially get their power through a competitive market. The incentive for Mainers to choose a 14 
 
competitive retail provider is limited because Maine’s standard offer service generation is 
already procured through a competitive bidding process. This keeps prices low and eliminates 
both the incentive for residential customers to choose a different provider and for competitive 
retail providers to serve residential customers in that market. The coefficient for Maine is 
negative and statistically significant suggesting that Maine’s unique style of competition, 
although not dependent on individual customers, may also be effective in lowering retail prices. 
  For the remaining states, the switch to retail competition did not necessarily lower retail 
prices. For CA, DE, IL, MD, MI, NJ, and DC, having a competitive market actually appears to 
have raised rates while MA and NY have statistically insignificant coefficients, implying no 
change in retail prices in these states. It is possible that the participation rate, which starts  rising 
after transitional pricing is eliminated, is picking up much of the effect of restructuring, as would 
be expected if price decreases are driven by competitive forces. The significant (and largely 
positive) coefficients on retail competition in states with relatively low participation suggest that 
higher rates of participation in the retail market are necessary to successfully lower residential 
electric rates.   
  Looking at the effects of price controls on state retail prices, the results for all states 
except for Massachusetts are significant.  For Texas, price controls increased retail prices, a 
finding that agrees with Kang and Zarnikau (2009).  This is likely a function of the design of the 
“price-to-beat” in Texas, which was held relatively high to encourage competitive providers to 
enter the market and to encourage customer switching to competitive retailers.  For the rest of the 
states, rate caps had a significant effect in lowering retail electricity prices.  
As a check of robustness and for added model flexibility, we estimated an additional 
model, adding time dummies to the baseline model.  Tables 4a, 4b, and 4c show that the basic 15 
 
results do not change when time dummies are added. Both the participation and total megawatt 
hours variables become more significant and their coefficients increase slightly.  Most notably, 
the coefficients on retail competition in MI and NJ lose significance, while the coefficients on 
retail competition for MA and NY become negative, implying a fall in retail prices with 
competition, although the coefficients remain insignificant.  The addition of time dummies has 
almost no effect on the RATECAP variables, with the exception of the price control variable 
becoming significant for MA. The time dummies themselves are insignificant 16 out of the 20 
years (table 4c). Interestingly, the coefficients for the time dummies are mostly positive in the 
first half of the sample period and negative in the latter half. Although these coefficients are not 
statistically significant, the negative signs suggest some overall downward movement of retail 
prices over the period. This could suggest that the time dummies in these periods are picking up, 
to some degree, the effects of national level wholesale deregulation initiatives around this time, 
as well as newly restructured wholesale markets overseen by regional transmission operators and 
independent system operators.  
IV. Discussion 
  The recent expiration of transitional price controls in many states’ competitive electricity 
markets has provided us with a data set that allows us to shed light on whether a truly 
competitive retail market lowers rates for residential customers. Our results strongly suggest that 
if such a market is designed correctly, residential customers may benefit from competition 
among electricity providers. Although the level of benefit may vary, evidence also suggests that 
there is no single correct way to implement a successful competitive retail market, as 
demonstrated by the successes of states with very different approaches (Maine and Texas, for 
example).  16 
 
  Our results show that none of the retail electricity market designs yield instant price 
reductions for customers. States that held prices artificially low during the transition to a 
competitive market may have seen lower prices initially; however, the long-run effect of 
artificially depressed prices is a misallocation of resources and an inefficient electricity market. 
Consumers have no incentive to switch to an alternative electricity provider and providers have 
no incentive to enter the market to serve residential customers.  A successfully designed market 
must provide profit opportunities for providers as well as incentives for consumers to switch 
providers. Although this may result in higher-than-desired rates initially, in the long-run 
intensified competition is more to likely yield sustainable lower rates. An alternative seemingly-
successful approach is to procure standard-offer electricity services through a competitive 
bidding process, as in Maine. This approach does not have the dependence on retail customers’ 
participation, but still has the potential to yield some level of benefit resulting from competition.  
  Beyond simply reducing electricity rates, a competitive retail market holds the potential 
to achieve other policy goals through the workings of the marketplace. If increased generation 
from alternative fuels is a policy goal and there are consumers demanding electricity from 
alternate fuels, a competitive retail market can match these customers with their suppliers. As 
Roe et.al. (2001) note, an increased willingness to pay for electricity generated from renewable 
fuels suggests that a competitive retail market may be one step in achieving renewable energy 
goals.  
  It is also important to consider the impacts of new smart grid technologies and alternative 
rate structures on competitive retail electricity markets. Our results show that in the current 
environment, a robust competitive retail electricity market can offer lower average monthly 
electricity rates. As new technologies increase customer price awareness, rate structures such as 
time-of-use and real time pricing—pricing that more closely reflects fluctuations in the 17 
 
wholesale market—offer the potential for greater pricing transparency and even greater average 
monthly savings. However, in this environment retail electricity providers are no longer 
competing with an advertised monthly rate and may offer a wider variety of more complex rate 
plans. Such an environment would obviously benefit customers who have high demand 
elasticities or who have the highest demand during off-peak hours.  Overall reductions in state-
level average monthly prices, as we show in this paper, are less clear.  This is an area for future 
research as smart grid technologies become more widespread in mature competitive markets.   
V.  Conclusion 
  The restructuring of U.S. electricity markets has received a great deal of attention in the 
energy economics literature, particularly in the mid 2000s as many states experimented with 
retail competition. Earlier studies on the effects of restructuring initiatives have failed to reach a 
consensus, particularly as these initiatives apply to residential customers. Previous efforts to 
study this topic were complicated by an inseparability of the effects of temporary transitional 
pricing schemes from the true effects of a competitive market. With several years of data 
following the expiration of many of these temporary pricing schemes, we revisit this issue using 
an econometric approach unique to this literature. Increasing participation in the competitive 
market appears to be a crucial element in reducing residential electric rates, while price 
reductions detected by earlier studies were likely driven by price controls rather than competitive 
forces. With the exception of Maine’s somewhat unique bid-for-generation setup, states that have 
failed to provide the proper market incentives for residential customers to switch to a competitive 
provider and for firms to provide electricity to residential customers have been less successful in 
reducing residential electric rates.  Our findings suggest that with a market design that 
encourages adequate participation, a competitive retail electricity market can benefit residential 
customers.       18 
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Rate Cap End 
CA   Gas  0.6%  Deregulation Suspended September 2001 
CT   Nuclear  24.6%  July 2000  July 2000  January 2007 
DC   Petroleum  3.4%  January 2001  January 2001  February 2007 
DE   Coal  2.6%  October 2000  October 2000  May 2006 
IL   Coal  0.01%  May 2002   August 1998  January 2007 
MA   Gas  12.3%  March 1998  March 1998  March 2005 
MD   Coal  6.7%  July 2000  July 2000  June 2006 
ME   Gas 2.6%  March  2000  N/A N/A 
MI   Coal  0.0%  January 2002  January 2002  January 2006 
NH  Nuclear  N/A  July 1998  July 1998  May 2006 
NJ   Nuclear  0.5%  June 1999  June 1999  August 2003 
NY   Gas  17.9%  May 1999  May 1999  August2001 
OH  Coal  22%  January 2001  January 2001  --- 
PA   Coal  11.3%  January 2000  January 2000  January 2011 
RI  Gas  N/A  July 1998  January 1998  January 2004 
TX   Gas  50.6%  January 2002  January 2002  January 2007 
VA  Coal  N/A  Deregulation Suspended April 2007 
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Table 2.  State Electricity Generation by Source: 2008 
 
  State  CA CT DE  IL  MA  MD  ME  MI 
Net Gen 
(GWh)  207,984  30,409 7,523  199,500 42,505 47,360 17,094  114,989 
Percent 
From 
Coal  0.6 14.4  70.0 48.4  25.0  57.5  2.1  60.7 
Petroleum  1.2  1.7  2.9  0.1  5.0 0.9 3.1 0.4 
Gas  60.3  26.5  18.4  2.1  50.6 3.9 43.2 8.4 
Nuclear  6.8 50.8  -  47.7  13.8  31.0  -  27.4 
Hydro  15.8 1.8  -  0.1  2.7  4.2  26.1  1.2 
Other 
Renewables  9.1 2.4 2.2  1.5  3.0  1.3  23.7  2.3 
 
  State  NH NJ  NY  OH  PA  RI  TX VA DC 
Net Gen 
(GWh)  10,977 63,674 140,322 153,412 222,351 7,387  404,788 72,679 72.3 
Percen 
From 
Coal  15.1 14.2  13.7  85.2  52.9  -  36.3  43.7  - 
Petroleum  0.6  0.5 2.7  0.9  0.4 0.4 0.3 1.6  100.0 
Gas  30.9 32.6  31.3  1.6  8.4  97.4  47.7  12.8  - 
Nuclear  40.9 50.6  30.8  11.4  35.4  -  10.1  38.4  - 
Hydro  7.1 - 19.0 0.3  1.1 0.1 0.3 1.4  - 
Other 























6 Coefficients for PARTICIPATION, PCNTHYDRO, and PCNTNUCLEAR have been multiplied by 100 to allow for an interpretation analogous to 
the logged variables. For example, the results for the sum of lags 1-6 of the PARTICPATION variable should be read “a 1 percent increase in 
PARTICIPATION results in a -0.4557 percent decrease in the dependent variable”. 
 
Baseline Model 
Dependent Variable: lnsarprice 1-6 1-5 1-4 1-3 1-2 Lag 1
- - - - - - 0.1158
- - - - - - (0.0730)
0.2959** -0.4480** -0.0275 -0.2254** -0.2287 0.0260 -0.0472
(0.1142) (0.1874) (0.0803) (0.1000) (0.2049) (0.1012) (0.1294)
-0.1255* 0.0777 0.0507 0.0474 0.0266 0.0268 0.0377
(0.0648) (0.1102) (0.1029) (0.0914) (0.0633) (0.0366) (0.0325)
-0.0027 0.2930*** 0.2562*** 0.3083*** 0.3124** 0.1434** 0.2101***
(0.0934) (0.0723) (0.0968) (0.1170) (0.1224) (0.0613) (0.0511)
-0.0102 0.0154 0.0145 0.0111 -0.0039 0.0207** -0.0051
(0.0081) (0.0167) (0.0138) (0.0112) (0.0098) (0.0084) (0.0071)
0.0057 0.0051 -0.0061 -0.0015 -0.0340*** -0.0298*** 0.0011
(0.0140) (0.0355) (0.0195) (0.0239) (0.0104) (0.0106) (0.0095)
-0.0056 0.0069 0.0059 0.0099 0.0067 0.0039 0.0043
(0.0096) (0.0251) (0.0195) (0.0169) (0.0107) (0.0090) (0.0067)
0.000020 -0.000058 -0.000007 -0.000018 0.000005 0.000020 0.000014
(0.000034) (0.000118) (0.000105) (0.000081) (0.000057) (0.000029) (0.000033)
-0.00002 -0.000019 -0.000012 -0.000013 -0.000027 -0.000026 -0.000016
(0.00001) (0.000045) (0.000039) (0.000031) (0.000027) (0.000018) (0.000015)
Wald chi-square (80 d.f.): 
547.72
Prob > Chi2     
0.000
Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(2) in first 
differences:  
z=1.34
Prob > z      
0.180
Prob > Chi2  
0.313
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
Values in parentheses below coefficients are robust standard errors.
lnsarprice
Lagged Effects (Sum of lags)






















































*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;              
* significant at 10%





























*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;              
* significant at 10%
























Baseline Model                       
w/ Time Dummies
Dependent Variable: lnsarprice 1-6 1-5 1-4 1-3 1-2 Lag 1
- - - - - - 0.1284*
- - - - - - (0.0699)
0.3216*** -0.3803*** 0.0232 -0.1760* -0.2005 0.0428 -0.0357
(0.0916) (0.1406) (0.1192) (0.0912) (0.1794) (0.1075) (0.1440)
-0.1280** 0.0634 0.0375 0.0364 0.0173 0.0203 0.0353
(0.0651) (0.1162) (0.1091) (0.0962) (0.0661) (0.0368) (0.0314)
0.0375 0.4736*** 0.3768** 0.3973*** 0.3752*** 0.1852*** 0.2312***
(0.1024) (0.1500) (0.1495) (0.1269) (0.1286) (0.0672) (0.0520)
-0.0042 0.0191 0.0215 0.0166 0.0015 0.0245*** -0.0039
(0.0082) (0.0158) (0.0136) (0.0105) (0.0081) (0.0085) (0.0069)
0.0056 0.0061 -0.0051 -0.0009 -0.0333*** -0.0298*** 0.0003
(0.0139) (0.0370) (0.0211) (0.0248) (0.0117) (0.0113) (0.0098)
-0.0051 0.0089 0.0076 0.0112 0.0077 0.0046 0.0046
(0.0095) (0.0254) (0.0197) (0.0173) (0.0113) (0.0093) (0.0070)
0.000019 -0.000043 0.000006 -0.000008 0.000013 0.000026 0.000016
(0.000033) (0.000128) (0.000114) (0.000090) (0.000065) (0.000033) (0.000033)
-0.000022* -0.000033 -0.000023 -0.000022 -0.000035 -0.000031* -0.000020
(0.000013) (0.000048) (0.000042) (0.000033) (0.000028) (0.000018) (0.000015)
Wald chi-square (100 d.f.): 
401.35
Prob > Chi2     
0.000
Arellano-Bond test 
for AR(2) in first 
differences:  
z=1.59
Prob > z       
0.111
Prob > Chi2  
0.231
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
Values in parentheses below coefficients are robust standard errors.
























































*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;              
* significant at 10%


































*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;              
* significant at 10%











































*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
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